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Abstract
We study antitrust enforcement in which the ne must obey four legal principles:
punishments should t the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and min-
imum nes. We integrate these legal principles into an innitely-repeated oligopoly
model. Bankruptcy considerations ensure abnormal cartel prots. We derive the op-
timal ne schedule that achieves maximal social welfare under these legal principles.
This optimal ne schedule induces collusion on a lower price making it more attractive
than on higher prices. Also, raising minimum nes reduces social welfare and should
never be implemented. Our analysis and results relate to the marginal deterrence
literature by Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992).
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1 Introduction
The modern economic theory of law enforcement stems from Beckers (1968) seminal paper.
The key message is that the implementation of legal rules changes the economic incentives
for illegal practices and the main concern is how society should channel incentives to arrive
at an e¢ cient deterrence of such practices. This requires deterring crime only when it is
e¢ cient to do so and implementing enforcement in the most cost e¤ective way. Antitrust
regulation to deter cartels incorporated the issue of sustainable concerted illegal activities
by several o¤enders.1 Most of the current literature, however, is rather silent on how to
integrate legal principles into the economic analysis.2 Such principles reect the societys
moral values about justice and what legal rules are feasible. Legal principles may conict
with the economic principle of e¢ ciency, which makes deterrence less e¤ective. The central
aim of this paper is to reconcile legal principles and the economic theory of law enforcement
by integrating such principles into a model where one can channel incentives to arrive at the
maximal feasible deterrence of illegal concerted activities.
Beckers original analysis suggests a simple rule: Deter crime only when the harm it causes
is greater than the benet accruing to the o¤ender, and to do it by setting the ne and the
probability of conviction so that the expected penalty just equals the o¤enders benet.3 As
this theory takes the view that increasing the rate of law enforcement entails positive social
costs, while nes are socially costless, the optimal law enforcement for cartels dictates to set
nes to the maximum level in order to save on inspection costs. An adaptation of this rule
to antitrust law enforcement is provided by Landes (1983). In the case of cartels, benet
consists of the additional collusive prots plus any cost saving and quality improvement the
coordinated practice may generate, net of any cost of enforcement, while harm consists of
the consumer surplus transferred to rms in the form of collusive prots plus the utility of
1See, for example, Harrington (2004, 2005).
2Notable exceptions include Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) or Cooter and Ulen (2007).
3Risk aversion and legal errors could reduce the optimal ne, see e.g. Garoupa (1997, 2001), Polinsky
and Shavell (1984, 1991, 1992, 2000).
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the foregone consumption due to the higher price, i.e., the deadweight loss. It has been
argued by many researchers, such as Werden and Simon (1987) and Buccirossi and Spagnolo
(2007), that the cartels benet from price-xing is smaller than the harm it causes and that
there are no such collusive infringements that may enhance social welfare. Hence, according
to this simple rule, the e¢ cient expected ne should be set at the lowest level that deters all
possible cartels or all possible collusive prices and to set nes to the maximum level in order
to save on inspection costs.
Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) argue that this simple policy prescription is too much
in contrast with current practices of antitrust law enforcement in both the US and the EU.
First, legislation sets restrictive ceilings to the maximum applicable ne due to bankruptcy
considerations. Second, an important legal principle is that punishments should be based on
the gravity of the o¤ense in order to reect societys harm and illegal gains. For antitrust,
the legislation attempts to relate the ne to a rough measure of gravity that is approximated
by the cartels illegal gains in the US and by the cartel overcharge in the EU. These gravity
measures aim to capture the consequences of cartel behavior for the colluding rms and their
victims. Third, an equally important legal principle is the principle of proportionality; the
regulator should not take any action that exceeds the one which is just necessary to achieve
the objective (see Fish, 2008). In terms of the ne structures, this principle implies that the
ne should not be in excess of the lowest ne that su¢ ces to prevent criminal activities.
Ceilings on antitrust nes have been analyzed by Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) and
Wils (2007). They argue that the ceilings on antitrust nes in both the US and the EU are
insu¢ cient to deter cartels. The ceiling makes antitrust policies either completely ine¤ective,
such that the cartel can sustain all prices including the monopoly price, or at best partially
e¤ective but in such a way that only low prices are deterred, but the high prices are still
sustainable by the cartel. This raises the issue whether such negative result is inevitable in
the presence of legal ceilings on nes.
One of our main contributions is to revise previous policy prescriptions for an extension
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of the model in Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) in which the above legal principles are
accounted for. In our model, the price is a continuous variable that is set strategically by
the cartel to maximize its prot given the antitrust enforcement. Antitrust enforcement is
endogenous and it is set strategically so that social welfare is maximized while obeying the
legal principles. Technically speaking, the ne structure is a function of the cartel price and
other parameters of the model. Optimizing over the space of all feasible ne schedules is a
challenging mathematical problem that we solve by sound economic reasoning alone without
the need of complicated mathematics.
Our major result is that even in the presence of legal ceilings, it is possible to design a more
e¤ective ne structure that is welfare improving when compared to the policy prescriptions
currently available in the literature. We demonstrate this by constructing the most e¤ective
optimal ne schedule that satises the four legal principles. This ne schedule induces the
lowest cartel price that is optimal for the cartel and, hence, reduces the dead-weight loss
to its lowest achievable level. This improvement is achieved by making collusion on lower
prices more attractive than collusion on higher prices. This result and the derived optimal
ne schedule can be related to the literature on marginal deterrence by Stigler (1971), Shavell
(1992), and Wilde (1992). Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) analyze individual o¤enders and
only two illegal acts under a constant legal upper bound. They derive that the ne for a
more harmful o¤ence should be set equal to the legal upper bound, while less harmful crime
should receive a lower punishment. This ne schedule induces o¤enders to choose the least
harmful act. Our analysis shows how to generalize the results of Shavell (1992) and Wilde
(1992) to the case of a non-constant legal upper bound and group violations with multiple
concerted illegal actions in the context of antitrust enforcement.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the legal principles and
how we implement them. Section 3 outlines the model. The optimal ne schedule is derived
in Section 4. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
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2 Legal Principles of Antitrust
Current legislations in the US and EU restrict nes based on legal and economical principles
such as punishments should t the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and
minimum nes. In this section, we discuss these four principles and how to incorporate them
into our analysis.
Punishments Fit the Crime: Antitrust guidelines in the US and EU are founded on
the legal principle that punishment should t the crime, see DOJ (2010) and EC (2006).
In practice, this principle translates into higher nes for higher-gravity o¤enses. Generally
speaking, the gravity of an o¤ence is related to both the harm caused by the o¤ense and the
cartels illegal gains. In the US, the gravity is measured by the cartels illegal gains, while
in the EU, it is approximated by the cartel overcharge.
Principle of Proportionality: An important principle of current legislation is the principle
of proportionality that states that regulators should not take any action that exceeds the
one which is just su¢ cient to achieve the same outcome, see e.g. Fish (2008). Interpreting
this principle in terms of the ne structure, it requires that the ne should not be more than
the lowest possible ne that would induce the same market outcome. If nes are considered
to be socially costless, there is no reason to adopt this principle. However, excessive nes
may amplify the possible negative impact of antitrust enforcement, which can stem from
unobservable legal errors. Hence, the rationale for adopting the principle of proportionality
is to minimize any potential undesirable impact of the antitrust policy.
Bankruptcy Considerations: Both the US and EU legislation impose ceilings on nes.
These ceilings are justied on the ground that legislators do not want to jeopardize the
nancial stability of the o¤ending rms. Besides employment considerations, high nes that
cause bankruptcy are against the ultimate goal of antitrust law because such high nes would
reduce the number of active competitors in the market.
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In the EU, nes are limited up to 10% of overall total annual turnover, see EC (2006).
Total turnover is indirectly related to the illegal gains or price-markups in the markets
corrupted by cartel agreements, because it consists of the total sales over all the product
markets in which the company operates, while only some of these markets may be involved
in the collusive agreement. There is no formal legal upper bound on the antitrust nes in
the US. However, in many cases, such as the UCAR 1993 case, nes were reduced due to
rmsinability to pay. In such a setting, the existence of an implicit ceiling on nes, which
is determined by the rmslimited liability, can be argued.
Minimum Fines: According to the current sentencing guidelines in the US, the base ne
can be zero for some mild o¤enses, see DOJ (2010). Moreover, rewarding rms that violate
antitrust law is not possible according to the current rules both in the US and the EU. This
indicates that imposing no or a zero ne has to be regarded as the minimum ne.
Modelling Legal Antitrust Principles: We analyze nes that satisfy the legal principles
listed above in an oligopoly model of price competition. Current antitrust legislation relates
the ne to a measure of gravity that is approximated by the cartels illegal gains or by
the cartel overcharge.4 Because both cartels illegal gains and overcharge are positively
related to the relevant cartel price, we model the ne schedule as a function of cartel price to
accommodate the current practice in the US and EU. As in Becker (1968) and Posner (1976),
the optimal antitrust enforcement consists of a ne schedule and e¤ort level of inspection
and prosecution that maximize the social welfare. In addition, the ne schedule must satisfy
the four principles discussed above.
The bankruptcy considerations and the minimum nes impose upper and lower bounds
on the ne schedule. The upper bound is a given function of the cartel price in order to
4The 2006 Guidelines revise those adopted in 1998, with a view to increasing the deterrent e¤ect of nes.
Council Regulation 1/2003 (as with Council Regulation 17/62 before it) provides that companies may be
ned up to 10% of their total annual turnover. Within this limit, the revised Guidelines provide that nes
may be based on up to 30% of the companys annual sales to which the infringement relates. In particular,
the basic amount of the ne will be related to a proportion of the value of sales, depending on the degree of
gravity of the infringement, multiplied by the number of years of infringement.
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capture current guidelines in the US and EU. By doing so, our approach accommodates
for the three main interpretations of the current guidelines: a constant upper bound, a
percentage of annual overall turnover, and bounds related to the cartels illegal gains. With
respect to the minimum ne, the ne schedule is bounded by a legal lower bound in order
to capture the feature that rewards are not allowed in the current guidelines in the US and
EU.
The principle that punishment should t the crime implies that a higher cartel price
should cause a higher ne. In other words, the ne schedule should be non-decreasing in
order to incorporate the possibility that a range of mild o¤enses are not ned. The legal
principle of proportionality requires that the ne should be kept to the minimum that is just
necessary to induce the best social outcome within the domain of ne schedules that satisfy
the other three principles.
3 The Model
Consider an innitely-repeated oligopoly model with discounting in the presence of antitrust
enforcement. Given the probability to be detected and the ne structure, if the rms collude,
they will be detected probabilistically and ned according to the ne structure. We study
a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of this repeated game model where the cartel
maximizes its present value of the stream of prots under the antitrust policy that satises
the four legal principles discussed in the previous section.
In every period, n  2 rms compete in a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly model.5 Let
(p1; : : : ; pn) be a rms prot under price prole (p1; : : : ; pn), and denote (p)  i(p; : : : ; p)
when the rms collude at price p. Let opt (p)  supp0  (p0; p; : : : ; p) be the least upper
bound of a rms prot from a unilateral deviation against the cartel price p. Denote the
symmetric Nash equilibrium price and the maximal symmetric collusive price by pN and
pM , respectively. Assume that (p) and opt (p) are continuous and strictly increasing in
5This model includes homogeneous products, heterogeneous products, and spacial price competition Our
analysis can be adapted for quantity competition.
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p 2 [pN ; pM ], and opt (p) >  (p) for all p 2  pN ; pM. Without loss of generality, we
normalize this oligopoly model such that (pN) = 0 and interpret  (p) as the net prot
above 
 
pN

.
Antitrust enforcement consists of the antitrust authoritys (AA) e¤ort level to detect and
prosecute the cartel and a ne structure. A higher e¤ort of detection/prosecution leads to
a higher probability to detect the cartel, but associates with a higher cost. Due to limited
resources of the AA, assume that the probability to detect the cartel is given by  2 [0; 1).
Note that  = 0 is equivalent to a situation with no antitrust enforcement.
The ne structure is modeled as a function of the cartel price. If the rms are found
guilty of sustaining cartel price p 2 (pN ; pM ], then every rm will have to pay the one-time
ne (p). Here we maintain the specication of Rey (2003) that only misconduct in the
current period is prosecuted. The ne schedule () is a function of p that obeys the four
legal principles discussed in the previous section. It is continuous, nondecreasing, satises
proportionality, and the legal upper and lower bounds. The legal upper bound  () is
assumed to be continuous and nondecreasing in p.
The legal principle of proportionality requires some explanation. A ne schedule that is
limited by an insu¢ cient legal upper bound is ine¤ective to deter some cartel prices and,
hence, the cartel will form. Given  and (), the cartel will choose the optimal cartel price
that maximizes the present value of its members prot with discount factor  2 (0; 1). The
ne schedule () satises the legal principle of proportionality if there does not exist another
ne schedule ^()  () such that ^() induces the same optimal cartel price as () does.
This class of ne schedules accommodates the current practice of nes that are related to
either the illegal prots or cartel overcharge through the gravity of the o¤ence as described
in OECD (2002), EC (2006), and DOJ (2010).
Observe that the static Nash equilibrium price pN is always sustainable by subgame
perfect equilibrium for all  2 (0; 1), which is also the rst-best outcome in the model
outlined above. We now discuss a stationary subgame perfect equilibria supported by the
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following modied trigger strategy prole in the presence of antitrust enforcement: The rms
collude at price p > pN in the rst period and continue to set price p as long as no rm
deviates from the cartel price p. Any price deviation by some of the rms will lead to the
static Nash equilibrium price pN in every period thereafter. The behavior after any deviation
reects a permanent breakdown of trust among the rms, and without trust, the rms will
not be able to form a cartel anymore. As in Motta and Polo (2003), here we assume that
the cartel will continue every time it is detected and ned. Alternatively, Harrington (2004,
2005) and Houba, Motchenkova, and Wen (2012) consider situations where the cartel will
dissolve with either certainty or some probability each time it is detected. Assuming the
cartel will reestablish after each time it is detected is consistent with the cartels prot-
maximizing behavior. It is worthwhile to point out that how the cartel behaves after it is
detected does not change the qualitative aspect of our analysis and results.
Let v(p; ) be the present value of a rms expected prot from the above strategy prole.
It equals the current illegal net prots  (p), minus the expected ne  (p), plus the expected
continuation value v(p; ). Solving for v(p; ) yields the following prot function for every
cartel member:
v(p; ) =
 (p)   (p)
1   : (1)
As in Motta and Polo (2003), price-deviating rms will not be prosecuted.6 Given the
modied trigger strategy prole, the prot of any rm from a unilateral deviation is equal
to the short-term net gain opt (p) in the current period, minus an expected ne of zero
(no prosecution), plus the normalized prot from pN forever. The necessary and su¢ cient
condition to support cartel price p 2  pN ; pM by a subgame perfect equilibrium is
v(p; ) =
 (p)   (p)
1    
opt (p) : (2)
An optimal cartel price maximizes the present value of each rms expected prot and the
6Alternative assumptions such as the possibility of prosecuting price-deviating rms would only relax the
equilibrium condition for collusion to be sustainable. Hence, our results will not qualitatively change if such
alternative assumption were imposed.
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set of optimal cartel prices is
PC () = arg max
p2(pN ;pM ]
v(p; ) subject to v(p; )  opt (p) : (3)
Observe that a lower cartel price implies a lower deadweight loss, or a higher social welfare.
Hence, our objective is to identify the optimal ne schedule that induces the lowest optimal
cartel price in the class of ne schedules that satisfy the four legal principles. The design
of the optimal ne schedule takes into account the optimal reaction by the cartel to the
antitrust enforcement.
4 The Optimal Fine Schedule
In this section, we will characterize the optimal ne schedule in the following three steps.
First, we identify the prot level the cartel can guarantee to each rm when facing any ne
schedule that satises the four legal principles. Second, given the legal lower bound of a ne
schedule, we derive the lowest possible cartel price at which each rm receives the minmax
prot we identied in step one. Lastly, we provide a ne schedule that satises the four legal
principles and induces the minimal cartel price. We will show that this ne schedule is the
lowest ne schedule that also induces this minimal cartel price, and it is the optimal ne
schedule.
4.1 The Minmax Cartel Prot
The rationale of the Beckerian tradition is that the expected loss of being punished should
outweigh the expected benet of committing the crime, see e.g., Becker (1968) or Posner
(1976). The condition of marginal deterrence in Stigler (1970) states that the marginal
benet of an illegal activity should be equal to the marginal expected ne to deter such an
activity. In its most elementary form, this suggests (p)  (p) in our antitrust enforcement
problem, where the Beckerian tradition and Stiglers marginal deterrence are equivalent. If
the AA were able to set the ne high enough, such as (p) > 1

(p) for all p > pN , it would
be unprotable for the rms to collude because equilibrium condition (2) fails for all p > pN .
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Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) and Wils (2007), however, point out that the current
inspection e¤orts and the existing upper bounds on nes in both the US and EU are insu¢ -
cient to deter cartels. This suggests that the existing legal upper bound  (p) not only fails
the Beckerian structure but also is not high enough to deter cartel formation so that
v(p; )  opt (p),  (p)  1


(p)  (1  )opt (p) (4)
for some p 2 (pN ; pM ]. Accordingly, we assume that the exogenous legal upper bound  (p)
satises (4), so that any ne schedule (p) bounded by the legal upper bound  (p) is also
insu¢ cient to deter all cartel prices.
Recall that we are searching for the optimal ne schedule that satises the four legal
principles, including the legal upper bound. For any ne schedule (p)   (p), observe that
if condition (4) is satised at p > pN , then
v(p; ) =
 (p)   (p)
1   
 (p)   (p)
1   = v(p;
)  opt (p) ; (5)
which implies that such p can also be sustained as a cartel price when the ne schedule (p)
is imposed. Inequality (5) also implies that if the rms set the corresponding optimal cartel
price, each cartel member receives no less when facing (p) than when facing the upper legal
bound  (p). In other words, when facing a ne schedule that obeys the legal upper bound,
each cartel member should receive at least what it can receive when facing the legal upper
bound and setting the corresponding optimal cartel price.
Proposition 1 For all ne schedules ()   (), we have
max
p:v(p;)opt(p)
v(p; )  max
p:v(p;)opt(p)
v(p; ): (6)
Proof. Take any optimal cartel price when facing the ne schedule (),
pC 2 arg max
p
v(p; ) subject to v(p; )  opt(p):
Because (pC)    pC, we have v(pC ; )  v(pC ; )  opt(p), so pC can also be sustained
as a cartel price if the ne schedule is (p). Note that the left-hand side of (6) is greater
than or equal to v(pC ; )  v(pC ; ), which is the right-hand side of (6).
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In fact, the right-hand side of (6) is at least what the cartel can guarantee each member
when facing any function that obeys the legal upper bound. It plays an important role in
nding the optimal ne schedule. Accordingly, we denote this minmax cartel prot as
v = max
p
v(p; ) subject to v(p; )  opt(p)
= min

max
p
v(p; ) subject to v(p; )  opt(p):
Under the legal upper bound (), the condition for sustainable cartel prices requires that
v
 ;   opt (). Figure 1 illustrates both v  ;  and opt (), together with the range of
sustainable cartel prices between the square brackets on the price axis. Under the legal upper
bound (), the cartel sets an optimal cartel price p in this range and each rm obtains v.
The minmax cartel prot v plays a prominent role in determining the optimal ne
schedule. It can be viewed as the cartels security level or the lowest maximal cartel prot
for all ne schedules that are bounded by the legal upper bound. More specically, for any
ne schedule () that is bounded by the legal upper bound (), a rms prot v (; ) is
always bounded from below by v
 ; . Because opt() does not depend on the ne schedule,
any cartel price under the legal upper bound, such as pC(), can also be sustained as a cartel
price under such a ne schedule (). Therefore, under ne schedule ()  (), the cartel is
able to obtain at least as v by setting price at p:
v(p; )  v(p; ) = v  opt(p) (7)
In general, however, each rm may receive more than v when facing a ne schedule that is
less than the legal upper bound.
4.2 The Minimal Cartel Price
Imposing the legal upper bound will certainly induce the minmax cartel prot v to every
rm. However, given that it is impossible to prevent the cartel under the legal upper bound,
the objective of antitrust enforcement is not to minimize the cartel prot, but rather to min-
imize the harm caused by the cartel. Given a ne schedule must also satises the three other
11
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ppN p
 pM
[ ]
v
opt(p)
v(p; )
v(p; )
Figure 1: The minmax cartel prot v and the optimal cartel price p
legal principles, the question is how to minimize the harm caused by the cartel given that
each rm must receive a prot that is at least the minmax cartel prot. In this subsection,
we identity this achievable minimal cartel price.
Recall the value function (1) and any ne schedule must also be bounded from below by
some exogenous legal lower bound, normalized to be zero. For (p)  0, we have
v(p; ) =
(p)  (p)
1   
(p)
1   :
Proposition 1 asserts that no matter what ne is imposed, the optimal cartel prot is at
least v. Therefore, in order for any p 2 (pN ; pM ] to be a possible optimal cartel price, it
must be the case that
v  v(p; )  (p)
1   , (p)  (1  )v
: (8)
Given the monotonicity of the prot function (p) for p 2 (pN ; pM ], there is a unique price
p^ =  1((1  )v) at which (8) holds with equality, where  1() is the inverse function of 
for p 2 (pN ; pM ]. Therefore, given the constraint that ()  0, the cartel must set its price
equal to p^ or above in order to ensure each members prot is at least the minmax cartel
prot v. Now we argue that such p^ can be sustained as a cartel price if (p^) = 0. Observe
that
v(p^; 0) =
(p^)
1   = v
 = v(p; ) =
(p)  (p)
1    
opt(p); (9)
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where the last inequality is due to (7). Because (p)  0, the monotonicity of () implies
that (p^)  (p), which in turn implies that p^  p. Due to the assumption that opt() is
also monotonically increasing, (9) implies that
v(p^; 0)  opt(p)  opt(p^);
which means that p^ can be sustained as a cartel price. In fact, p^ is the lowest possible optimal
cartel price when the rms face any ne schedule that satises the four legal principles. For
this reason, we call p^ the minimal cartel price. This result is formally presented as
Proposition 2 For any ne schedule () that satises the four legal principles, any optimal
cartel price is bounded from below by the minimal cartel price p^ =  1((1  )v):
Built upon Figure 1, Figure 2 illustrates how the minimal cartel price is determined by
the minmax cartel prot. Recall that minmax cartel prot v is the maximal cartel prot
when the legal upper bound () is imposed. Given the monotonicity of prot function
v(p; 0) = (p)=(1  ), the minimal cartel price is the one at which each rm receives exactly
the minmax cartel prot when the legal lower bound 0 is imposed. For simplicity, we choose
not to illustrate the equilibrium condition as we have shown that if (p^) = 0, the minimal
cartel price p^ can be sustained as an equilibrium price by the modied trigger strategy prole.
In searching for the optimal ne schedule that satises the four legal principles where the
legal upper bound is insu¢ cient to deter cartel activity, the objective of antitrust enforcement
should shift to minimize the harm caused by the cartel. This translates into minimization
of the optimal cartel price in order to take into account the cartels response to the ne
schedule set. Proposition 2 shows that within the class of ne schedules considered, it is
impossible to reduce the cartel price below the minimal cartel price. Now the question is
whether it is feasible to induce this minimal cartel price with a ne schedule that not only
satises the upper and lower bounds, but also the monotonicity and, more importantly, the
proportionality. If such a ne schedule exists and indeed induces the minimal cartel price,
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Figure 2: The minimal cartel price p^.
it is the optimal ne schedule under the four restrictions imposed by the legal rules and
conventions.
4.3 Characterization of the Optimal Fine Schedule
We now derive a ne schedule under which the minimal cartel price is an optimal cartel price.
As we have argued, such a ne schedule induces the lowest possible optimal cartel price that
is the second-best outcome given that the cartel cannot be completely prevented due to the
legal upper bound on ne schedules. Hence, the ne schedule we derive is indeed the optimal
ne schedule. In doing so, we utilize all four legal principles, namely monotonicity, lower
and upper legal bounds, and proportionality.
In order to achieve the minimal cartel price p^, it is necessary that it can be sustained as
a cartel price and that each rm receives the minmax cartel prot v. This requires that the
ne should be set to 0 when the rms collude at the minimal cartel price p^. Because the ne
schedule must satisfy monotonicity and the legal lower bound of 0, we conclude that (p) = 0
for all p 2 [pN ; p^]. For this range of prices, whether they can be sustained as cartel prices
or not, monotonicity and the legal lower bound are binding in determining the optimal ne
schedule.
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Next consider the price range (p^; pM ]. If the legal upper bound () were imposed, the
cartel would receive at most a prot of v by selecting a cartel price p 2 (p^; pM ]. Given the
minmax cartel prot v from setting the price at the minimal cartel price p^, the necessary
and su¢ cient condition for p^ to be an optimal cartel price is that for all p 2 (p^; pM ]
either v(p; )  v or v(p; ) < opt(p): (10)
Condition (10) asserts that either p can be sustained as a cartel price but each rm does not
receive more prot than v, or p cannot be sustained at all. Rewriting (10) yields
either (p)  1

[(p)  (1  ) v] or (p) > 1


(p)  (1  ) opt(p) : (11)
The legal principle of proportionality requires that the ne is just high enough to reduce
the cartel prot either to v for any p 2 (p^; pM ], or to upset the equilibrium condition (2).
Moreover, in order to obey this principle we need to identify the minimum of these two
right-hand sides. This yields two cases in (11) depending whether opt(pM)  v or not.
This distinction can be related to the level of the legal upper bound (). In case the legal
upper bound is relatively low, v is relatively high and we have opt(pM)  v. The optimal
cartel price is then solely driven by the minmax prot level, and breaking cartel sustainability
is irrelevant in the determination of the optimal ne schedule, which is reected by the fact
that all cartel prices are sustainable. In the other case, the legal upper bound is relatively
high, v is relatively low and we have opt(pM) > v. Then, the sustainability condition also
plays a key role in the determination of the optimal ne schedule. We treat the rst case in
this section, derive the corresponding optimal ne schedule, and utilize it to illustrate our
main results and contributions to the literature, and the policy implications. The analysis of
the second case has similar policy implications, however, it involves technical complications
related to existence of the optimal ne schedule on some intervals of prices. For that reason,
we postpone the analysis of this case to the Appendix.
In the remainder of this section, we consider that case of opt(pM)  v. Due the
monotonicity of opt(p), we have that opt(p)  v for all p 2 [pN ; pM ]. Consequently, (11)
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Figure 3: The optimal ne ^ (solid) and the legal upper bound  (dotted).
simplies to (p)  1

[(p)  (1  )v] ; where the right-hand side is monotonic, continuous,
and obeys both legal bounds. The legal principle of proportionality requires that the ne
schedule is just high enough to reduce the cartel prot to v for any p 2 (p^; pM ] and, therefore,
equality must hold. This gives us the optimal ne schedule for p 2 [p^; pM ]. Together with
the optimal ne schedule for p 2 (pN ; p^), we obtain Proposition 3. The resulting optimal
ne schedule is illustrated in Figure 3.
Proposition 3 When opt(pM)  v, the optimal ne schedule is given by
^ (p) =
8<: 0; for p
N  p  p^;
1

[ (p)  (1  ) v] ; for p^ < p  pM : (12)
Proof. Because (p^) = (1  )v by Proposition 2, we have
lim
p!p^+
^(p) =
1

[(p^)  (1  )v] = 0;
hence, ^() in (12) is monotonic and continuous. From the construction, we know that such
a ne schedule obeys the legal lower and upper bounds. Notice that at p 2 [p^; pM ], the
optimal ne ^(p) is equal to the legal upper bound (p). If ^() is imposed, the minimal
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cartel price p^ is an optimal cartel price because any other price either cannot be sustained
as a cartel price or each rm will receive at most the minmax cartel prot.
Recall that in the presence of the legal upper bound the rst-best ne schedule is infeasible
and antitrust enforcement is insu¢ cient to deter cartel activity. In this case, some cartel
prices can be sustained by the cartel and society incurs a deadweight loss. The important
question is how to keep the deadweight loss minimal given the legal upper bound. According
to Proposition 3, the e¤ectiveness of the ne schedule in reducing the optimal cartel price
can be maximally improved by adapting ne schedule (12). Figure 3 illustrates that this
ne schedule satises all four legal principles. Within this class of ne schedules, it is the
only one that achieves the smallest attainable optimal cartel price p^. Fine schedule (12)
induces the cartel to set p^ as its optimal cartel price. This price lies strictly between the
Nash equilibrium price pN and the optimal cartel price p when the legal upper bound is
imposed. This reduces the deadweight loss caused by the cartel.
The maximal reduction of the optimal cartel price is achieved by making all prices in the
range between p^ and pM as attractive as p by reducing the ne below the legal upper bound.
Moreover, ne schedule (12) does not punish mild o¤ences of collusion on cartel prices below
p^. This result supports the procedure of determination of the base ne in the current US
sentencing guidelines, see DOJ (2010), where o¤ences of mild gravity would be assigned a
base ne of zero. Note that the value function under ^ () is given by
v(p; ^) =

v (p; 0) ; for pN  p  p^;
v; for p^ < p  pM ; (13)
which is illustrated in Figure 4.
Proposition 3 describes the unique SPE outcome supported by the modied trigger strat-
egy prole. Even if some prices above the minimal cartel price p^ can be sustained by the
cartel, they are all optimal in the sense that these yield the same prot v to the cartel.
In this equilibrium, the cartel selects the smallest optimal cartel price. There are practical
reason why the cartel may prefer to choose this smallest optimal cartel price, such as increase
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Figure 4: The value function v(p; ^) under the optimal ne ^ (p).
in the popularity of the product. Furthermore, if the cartel does not choose this smallest
optimal cartel price, the AA would have an incentive to increase the ne slightly higher than
^(p) for any price p > p^, so that the cartel would not choose such price p > p^.
For the case of a di¤erentiable prot function, the optimal ne schedule for cartel prices
in the upper/second range satises the condition of marginal deterrence in Stigler (1970)
that states that the marginal benet of the o¤ense should be equal its marginal expected
cost. Even in the absence of di¤erentiability, marginal deterrence holds in the following
sense. The cartel has no incentive to set a price in the lower range of prices because the
present value of prots for each individual rm is strictly increasing in the cartel price on
this range due to the zero ne. Also, this present value is less than the security level and,
hence, these cartel prices are not optimal.
These insights also relate to the results in Block, Nold, and Sidak (1981) where the design
of the optimal (di¤erentiable) ne schedule should be such that the condition of marginal
deterrence is achieved on

pN ; pM

. Application of their ideas to our setting would imply that
the optimal ne schedule solves the di¤erential equation 0(p) = 0(p) for p 2 p^; pM under
the additional condition (p) = (p) instead of (pM) = (pM). In case the di¤erential
equation would also be solved for p 2 pN ; p^, it violates the legal lower bound. Stigler (1970)
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and Block, Nold, and Sidaket (1981) are silent on the issue of sustainability of concerted
illegal actions and, hence, our results generalize their analysis to include such concerted
actions. In addition, we also extend the analysis to nondi¤erentiable prot functions and non-
constant legal upper bounds. Note that our results directly apply to individual illegal actions
in antitrust enforcement by ignoring the equilibrium condition in our model. Therefore, both
individual and group violations with concerted illegal actions are integrated into one unifying
framework.
Before we relate our results to the marginal deterrence studied by Shavell (1992) and
Wilde (1992), we rst discuss the special case of a constant legal upper bound in our model.
Let (p) =  for all p 2 pN ; pM, then prot function v(p; ) becomes strictly increasing on
the entire interval

pN ; pM

. In characterizing the optimal cartel price p we must distinguish
two cases depending on whether pM can be sustained under the constant legal upper bound
. First, if pM can be sustained as a cartel price, then the monotonicity of v(p; ) implies
that the optimal cartel price is p = pM , the minmax cartel prot is v = v(pM ; ), and
the minimal cartel price is p^ =  1(
 
pM
   ). The optimal ne schedule imposes the
maximal ne  on the most grave o¤ence pM , and all lower prices are ned below the legal
upper bound. Second, if pM fails to be a cartel price, then monotonicity of v(p; ) implies
that p < pM is the maximal sustainable cartel price, which is the highest price p 2 pN ; pM
that solves  (p) = (1  ) opt (p).
With these observations in mind, we relate our results to the theory of marginal deterrence
in Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) for individual o¤enders and two illegal acts under a
constant legal upper bound and a common production of detection and conviction.7 These
references derive that the optimal ne is non-decreasing in the level of harm in order to
induce o¤enders to choose the least harmful act. For antitrust enforcement, illegal acts are
represented by a continuum of cartel prices and both the cartels illegal gains and societys
7The inspection and prosecution e¤orts of antitrust enforcement are such that a sector must be inves-
tigated in order to determine the actual cartel price set. The AA cannot target its activities on specic
cartel prices beforehand. Therefore, in terms of Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992), the production of antitrust
enforcement classies as common production of detection and prosecution.
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deadweight loss are increasing in the cartel price. Although the optimal ne schedule is non-
decreasing in the cartel price, it is directly related to illegal gains rather than to societys
harm. As a thought experiment in terms of two illegal acts under a constant ne schedule
in our model, consider the case p 2 [p^; p) and, for a constant legal upper bound, p that is
either the monopoly price or the maximal sustainable cartel price. We have shown that the
optimal ne for p is strictly lower than the ne for p. For the remaining case p 2  pN ; p^
and p, the optimal ne schedule cannot induce the cartel to choose the least harmful act
because for such price even the zero ne is not low enough to provide the proper incentives.
If that case arises in their model, Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) set the ne equal to the
legal upper bound and this is in contrast to the principle of proportionality that would set
the ne equal to zero. Recall that our results directly apply to individual illegal actions by
ignoring the equilibrium condition in our model. To summarize, our results indicate how
to generalize the results in Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) to the case of a non-constant
legal upper bound and both individual and group violations with multiple concerted illegal
actions in the context of antitrust enforcement.
5 Concluding Remarks
We provide a coherent framework to study the economic consequences of legal and economics
principles in crime enforcement. Our analysis characterizes the optimal ne schedule that
maximizes social welfare and we show that it coincides with the ne schedule that minmaxes
the cartels prot. This schedule remains below the legal ceiling, except at the cartel price
where the minmax cartel prot is achieved under this legal ceiling, and there is a range of low
cartel prices for which the ne is set to zero according to the legal lower bound. Hence, the
main implication of our analysis is that the antitrust authority should not punish maximally
overall, but punish in a smarter manner such that mild o¤enses are not ned at all. In
general, our results call for a subtle reconsideration of the common wisdom in the economics
of crime that setting the ne equal to the available legal upper bound always increases the
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e¤ectiveness of deterrence.
By either adding or substituting other legal principles, one can easily assess the impact
of such principles on the enforced cartel price. Therefore, our approach allows to quantify
the economic costs of adapting societys legal principles through the di¤erences in societys
deadweight losses. For example, increasing maximum penalties by shifting the legal ceiling
upwards decreases the cartels minmax value, and consequently, reduces the cartel price.
Although the antitrust authority should shrink the range of low cartel prices where it nes
zero and raises the ne schedule elsewhere, the optimal ne schedule remains below the legal
ceiling almost everywhere. As another example, imposing minimum nes, a popular call in
recent politics, will enable the cartel to set a higher price. Therefore, positive minimum nes
reduce social welfare and should never be imposed or, if they are currently implemented,
they should be abolished. Our analysis provides a technique to adequately deal with such
modications of legal rules.
Furthermore, in the literature on antitrust enforcement, see Harrington (2010) and Buc-
cirossi and Spagnolo (2007), it is often argued that corporate antitrust nes are insu¢ cient
to successfully deter cartel formation and that the legal upper bounds should be increased.
We agree that increasing the legal upper bound is a right trend in general. But we also show
that even in the presence of insu¢ cient legal upper bounds the e¤ectiveness of deterrence can
still be improved by reducing nes for mild o¤ences as our optimal ne schedule prescribes.
The derived optimal ne schedule can be related to the literature on marginal deterrence
by Stigler (1971), Shavell (1992), and Wilde (1992). Our analysis shows how to generalize
the results in Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992) to the case of a non-constant legal upper
bound and both individual and group violations with multiple concerted illegal acts in the
context of antitrust enforcement.
Finally, our analysis can be easily extended to incorporate the optimal choice of inspec-
tion e¤ort. In this case the optimal antitrust enforcement is characterized by a pair of
instruments (; ) that minimizes dead-weight loss and the social cost of enforcement. We
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can characterize the optimal antitrust enforcement in two steps; rst solve the optimal ne
schedule for detection probability , and then solve for the optimal level of the detection
probability and the corresponding optimal ne schedule. Since the minimal optimal cartel
price is continuous in , there exists a socially optimal level of inspection e¤orts.
Appendix: Optimal ne schedules when opt(pM) > v
In Section 4, we mentioned that we may have technical issues related to the existence of the
optimal ne schedule in case opt(pM) > v. This case corresponds to legal upper bounds
that are relatively high so that v is lower than opt(pM). In this appendix we analyze this
case in which the sustainability condition also plays a key role in the determination of the
optimal ne schedule. We show that there are two intervals of cartel prices, one where the
analysis of Section 4 still holds and one where a problem of existence of the optimal ne
schedule arises.
By opt() is increasing and opt(pM) > v, there exists a unique p 2 [p; pM) such that
opt(p) = v. For all p 2 [pN ; p], (11) once more simplies to  (p)  1

[(p)  (1  ) v] as
in Section 4 and, therefore, the same arguments imply that the ne schedule given by (12) is
the optimal ne schedule on this interval of prices. For p 2 (p; pM ], however, (10) and (11)
become
v(p; ) < opt(p), (p) > 1


(p)  (1  )opt(p) : (14)
This implies that all prices p 2 (p; pM ] are unsustainable as cartel prices. It is, however,
impossible to weaken this strict inequality condition to a weak inequality. The reason for
the strict inequality v(p; ) < opt(p) for p 2 (p; pM ] is very di¤erent from the reason for
the weak inequality v(p; )  v for p 2 [p^; p]. Recall that all p 2 [p^; p] are sustainable
and sustainability is not an issue because condition v(p; ) = v ensures that the cartel
would receive the minmax cartel prot even if the rms collude at price p. For any p 2
(p; pM ], however, equality instead of inequality in (14) would imply v(p; ) = opt(p) > v.
22
Consequently, the sustainable cartel price p would be more protable than v and the minimal
cartel price p^ could not be an optimal cartel price. Hence, any cartel price p 2 (p; pM ] must
be unsustainable and this requires strict inequality.
Condition (14) poses two issues in characterizing the optimal ne for p 2 (p; pM ] and
resolving these issues distracts attention from the fact that the antitrust authority can secure
the minimal cartel price p^. The rst issue is that the right-hand side of (14) need not be
non-decreasing. Within our domain of monotone ne schedules, the optimal ne schedule is
therefore bounded from below on the interval (p; pM ] by the monotone function  that is the
least monotone function that satises
(p)  (p)  (1  )opt(p) for p < p  pM : (15)
The function  exists, it is bounded from below by the constant function (p)   (1   )v
and bounded from above by the monotone function (p)   (1   )v   (p). Obviously,
equality in (15) holds in case the right-hand side is non-decreasing. Otherwise, there will be
a strict inequality for some or all p 2 (p; pM ].
If case (15) would hold with a strict inequality for all p 2 (p; pM ], which holds whenever
the right-hand side is decreasing in p, our analysis is done and the function  characterizes
the optimal ne schedule ^ for p 2 (p; pM ]. The optimal ne schedule is then given by
^ (p) =
8>><>>:
0; for pN  p  p^;
1

[ (p)  (1  ) v] ; for p^ < p  p;
1

(p); for p < p  pM :
(16)
This ne schedule satises all legal principles and it implements the minimal cartel price p^
as the least optimal cartel price.
Unfortunately, the strict inequality in (15) may not hold for all p 2 (p; pM ], which is the
case in the classic Bertrand oligopoly for which opt (p) = n (p), and this causes a second
issue namely the least ne schedule  fails as an optimal ne schedule on the interval (p; pM ].
The consequence is that we cannot obey the principle of proportionality on (p; pM ]. However,
if we weaken this principle, the antitrust authority would be able to implement the minimal
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cartel price p^ as the least optimal cartel price within the domain of ne schedules that obey
the other three legal principles. Note, however, that this issue is articial. As is standard in
many oligopoly models, we assume that money is perfectly divisible for technical convenience.
In reality, there is a smallest money unit and one can break the equality v(p; ) = opt(p)
by increasing  by one smallest money unit. Here, the technical convenience of perfectly
divisible money that served us well throughout the analysis turns against our main goal and
we regard it as a technical matter of no practical importance.
Formally, consider the domain of monotone continuous ne schedules that satisfy both
the lower and upper legal bounds. Within this domain, dene the ne schedule ^ as a
monotone continuous function on (p; pM ] such that limp!p ^(p) = (p)  (1  )v and8
(p)  (1  )opt(p) < ^(p)  (p)  (1  )v for p < p  pM .
Then, ^ can replace  in (16) and this modied ne schedule achieves the minimal cartel
price p^ as the least optimal cartel price. Although ^ can approximate  arbitrarily close, the
strict inequality in (14) excludes that ^ coincides with . So, we are able to satisfy three
principles and by a hair the principle of proportionality on the interval (p; pM ].
Proposition 4 When opt(pM) > v > 0, the ne schedule given by
^ (p) =
8>><>>:
0; for pN  p  p^;
1

[ (p)  (1  ) v] ; for p^ < p  p;
1

^(p); for p < p  pM ;
(17)
implements p^ as the least optimal cartel price, it satises the legal principles of punishment
ts the crime, the legal lower bound and the legal upper bound. Moreover, it satises the legal
principle of proportionality on [pN ; p].
Proof. First, notice that ^ () by (16) is continuous and monotonic. For p 2  pN ; p,
the proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 3, and every p 2 [p^; p] can be sustained
8Many functions ^ exist, such as ^ (p) =  (p) + " (p  p) for small enough " > 0. Clearly,  can be
approximated arbitrarily close, but the principle of proportionality, i.e., " = 0, is ruled out.
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as a cartel price from which each rm earns the minmax cartel prot v. For p 2  p; pM,
v(p; ^) < opt (p) implies that p cannot be sustained as a cartel price. Therefore, the least
optimal cartel price is equal to the minimal cartel price p^:
Although Proposition 4 does not pin down a unique optimal ne schedule, it provides a
possible candidate for the optimal schedule in some special cases or if we weaken the legal
principles. For example, if (p)  (1 )opt(p) is monotonically decreasing in p, then we can
choose (p) to be the constant (p) (1 )opt(p) =  (p) (1  ) v, and the corresponding
^ () by (16) is the optimal ne schedule. Recall from Section 4 that our insights relate to the
results in Block, Nold, and Sidak (1981) by letting the optimal (di¤erentiable) ne schedule
solve the di¤erential equation 0(p) = 0(p) for p 2 p^; pM under the additional condition
(p) = (p). This can also be done here and would result in the function ^ given by
^(p) = (p)  (1  )v on the interval  p; pM. Our analysis shows that such ne schedule
achieves the minimal cartel price p^, but that it involves excessive ning.
The ne schedule (16) coincides with the optimal ne schedule given in (12) for all
p 2  pN ; p and the intuition discussed in Section 4 remains valid. Recall that all these
cartel prices are sustainable. For p 2  p; pM, the ne function 1

[ (p)  (1  )v] is still
feasible and by its construction yields a prot of v to each individual rm. Because v <
opt (p) for all p 2  p; pM, any price higher than p cannot be sustained if ne schedule
1

[ (p)  (1  )v] is imposed. However, it is possible to further lower the ne below
1

[ (p)  (1  )v] as long as these prices cannot be sustained as cartel prices. In other
words, with any ne schedule such that
(p)  (1  )opt(p) < (p) < (p)  (1  )v; (18)
each individual rm gets a prot that lies strictly between v and opt (p). Because of the
rst inequality, the upper bound fails the principle of proportionality to deter cartel price p.
Application of our insights to the boundary case v = 0, which would violate condition (4),
yields p^ = p = pN and 1

^(p) as the optimal ne schedule on
 
pN ; pM

. For this boundary
25
case, all issues discussed in this appendix hold.
To summarize, we regard the non-existence of the optimal ne schedule that satises all
four legal principles on

pN ; pM

as a technical matter of no practical importance. However,
independent whether this issue arises, the facts remain that rst.the antitrust authority can
secure the minimal cartel price p^ by adopting one of the ne schedules given by (17) and
second, that such ne schedules satisfy all four legal principles on the interval

pN ; p

.
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